How managerial ownership and the market for corporate control can improve investment timing
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Guthrie, Graeme A. ; Hobbs, Cameron |
Published in: |
Journal of banking & finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4266, ZDB-ID 752905-3. - Vol. 128.2021, p. 1-22
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Subject: | managerial ownership | market for corporate control | manager-shareholder conflict | investment incentives | real options | antitakeover laws | Übernahme | Takeover | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Realoptionsansatz | Real options analysis | Investition | Investment |
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