How Managerial Ownership and the Market for Corporate Control Can Improve Investment Timing
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Guthrie, Graeme |
Other Persons: | Hobbs, Cameron (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Übernahme | Takeover | Führungskräfte | Managers | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (44 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 23, 2020 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3589923 [DOI] |
Classification: | d25 ; G31 - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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