How should performance signals affect contracts?
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
| Year of publication: |
01 February 2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel |
| Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
| Subject: | Informativeness principle | limited liability | option repricing | Pay-for-luck | performancebasedvesting | performance-sensitive debt | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Signalling | Aktienoption | Stock option | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability |
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten) |
|---|---|
| Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ISSN 2045-6573, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP15755 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431929