How should performance signals affect contracts?
Year of publication: |
01 February 2021
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Informativeness principle | limited liability | option repricing | Pay-for-luck | performancebasedvesting | performance-sensitive debt | Theorie | Theory | Signalling | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten) |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP15755 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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