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How should performance signals affect contracts?

Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Year of publication:
01 February 2021
Authors: Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel
Publisher: London : Centre for Economic Policy Research
Subject: Informativeness principle | limited liability | option repricing | Pay-for-luck | performancebasedvesting | performance-sensitive debt | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Signalling | Aktienoption | Stock option | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability
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