How the agency contract fails in hybrid mode : agency fees and distribution sequences
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Shu, Wenjun ; Xiao, Zhongdong ; Cao, Yiyin |
Published in: |
International transactions in operational research : a journal of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1475-3995, ZDB-ID 2019815-2. - Vol. 31.2024, 6, p. 4296-4331
|
Subject: | agency selling | contract selection | digital products | distribution sequence | Stackelberg game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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