Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Vida, Péter ; Forges, Francoise
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	Bayesian game \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| pre-play communication

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 3360
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008853866