Implementing efficient market structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Subject:	auctions \| mechanism design \| natural oligopoly \| entry

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Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 2000,19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	723719462 [GVK] hdl:10419/62258 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200019 [RePEc]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310273