Implementing Efficient Market Structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Mechanism design \| natural oligopoly \| auctions \| entry

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 269
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	757230067 [GVK] hdl:10419/75480 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_269 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010314843