Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games

It is argued that the revelation principle in multi-principal multi-agent games cannot be generalized. In other words, one cannot restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms, even if the concept of information is enlarged.

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Year of publication:	2014-01-06
Authors:	Piaser, Gwenaël
Institutions:	Institut de Préparation à l'Administration et à la Gestion (IPAG)
Subject:	Direct Mechanisms \| Incentive compatible \| Multiprincipals

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2014-049 13 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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