Incentive contract, equity pooling, and optimal securitization design
Yuqian Zhang
Year of publication: |
2025
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Authors: | Zhang, Yuqiang |
Published in: |
Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1099-1468, ZDB-ID 1491342-2. - Vol. 46.2025, 3, p. 1558-1570
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Subject: | equity inventive | equity pooling | mechanism design | moral hazard | security design | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Verbriefung | Securitization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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