Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Qi ; Lu, Lei ; Sun, Bo |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 66.2018, 4, p. 929-950
|
Subject: | Ambiguity | Executive compensation | Options | Relative performance evaluation | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
-
Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation
Gao, Zhan, (2017)
-
Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts
Chaigneau, Pierre, (2015)
-
Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
Sung, Jaeyoung, (2022)
- More ...
-
Liu, Qi, (2015)
-
Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
Liu, Qi, (2017)
-
Anomaly Discovery and Arbitrage Trading
Dong, Xi, (2020)
- More ...