Incentive provision with hidden characteristics : a unified approach

Martin Hellwig

Year of publication:	05 Dec. 2006
Other Persons:	Hellwig, Martin (contributor)
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

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