Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Kusterer, David J. |
Subject: | contract theory | experimental economics | multi-tasking | conflict | merger | regulation | public-private partnerships | behavioral biases | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft | Public-private partnership | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Experimentelle Ökonomik | Experimental economics | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | Online-Ressource (VI, 171 S.) graph. Darst. |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Hochschulschrift ; Thesis |
Language: | English |
Thesis: | Köln, Univ., Diss., 2014 |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Internet-Anschluß; Acrobat Reader |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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