Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents

vorgelegt von David Jakob Kusterer

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Kusterer, David J.
Subject:	contract theory \| experimental economics \| multi-tasking \| conflict \| merger \| regulation \| public-private partnerships \| behavioral biases \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft \| Public-private partnership \| Verhaltensökonomik \| Behavioral economics \| Experimentelle Ökonomik \| Experimental economics \| Theorie \| Theory

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