Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Loginova, Oksana ; Wang, Xinghe Henry ; Lu, Haibin
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Unternehmensnetzwerk \| Business network