Incentives, team production, transactions costs, and the optimal contract : estimates of an agency model using payroll records

Christopher Ferrall; Bruce Shearer

Year of publication:	1994
Authors:	Ferrall, Christopher
Other Persons:	Shearer, Bruce S. (contributor)
Publisher:	Kingston, Ontario : Inst. for Economic Research, Queens Univ.
Subject:	Transaktionskosten \| Transaction costs \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Vertrag \| Contract

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