Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition : theory and experiments
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
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Authors: | Dijkstra, Peter T. ; Haan, Marco ; Mulder, Machiel |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 50.2017, p. 1-33
|
Subject: | Collusion | Industry structure | Yardstick competition | Experiment | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Anreizregulierung | Incentive regulation | Theorie | Theory | Kartell | Cartel | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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