Inequity Aversion in Tournaments

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly. The principal never benefits from empathy between the workers, by he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less envious ones when they are low.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Demougin, Dominique ; Fluet, Claude
Institutions:	Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)
Subject:	Tournaments \| Inequity aversion \| Envy \| Incentives \| Performance

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J4 - Particular Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268