Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Incomplete contracts \| Know-how disclosure \| Joint ownership

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623472