Learning-by-doing in torts : liability and information about accident technology

Florian Baumann; Tim Friehe

In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Baumann, Florian ; Friehe, Tim
Publisher:	Düsseldorf : DICE
Subject:	Liability rules \| care incentives \| accident technology \| Haftung \| Liability \| Theorie \| Theory \| Unfall \| Accident \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Verkehrsunfall \| Traffic accident \| Technischer Fortschritt \| Technological change \| Anreiz \| Incentives