Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts

Peter M. Demarzo and Yuliy Sannikov

Year of publication:	January 2017
Authors:	DeMarzo, Peter M. ; Sannikov, Yuliy
Published in:	The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 84.2017, 1, p. 182-236
Subject:	Real options \| inside information \| moral hazard \| dynamic contracts \| payout policy \| information rents \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Insiderhandel \| Insider trading \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Dividende \| Dividend \| Realoptionsansatz \| Real options analysis \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Aktienrückkauf \| Share repurchase \| Vertrag \| Contract

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