Liars and inspectors : optimal financial contracts when monitoring is non-observable
Anna Maria C. Menichini; Peter J. Simmons
| Year of publication: |
2006
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|---|---|
| Other Persons: | Menichini, Anna Maria C. (contributor) ; Simmons, Peter J. (contributor) |
| Published in: |
Contributions to theoretical economics. - Berkeley, Calif. : Bepress, ISSN 1534-5971, ZDB-ID 2040052-4. - Vol. 6.2006, 1, p. 1-19
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| Subject: | Finanzmarkt | Financial market | Vertrag | Contract | Cash Flow | Cash flow | Kontrolle | Control | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat reader |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003341610