Managerial risk aversion and the structure of executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hrazdil, Karel ; Kim, Jeong-bon ; Novák, Jiri ; Zatzick, Christopher |
Published in: |
Corporate governance : an international review. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1467-8683, ZDB-ID 2062255-7. - Vol. 31.2023, 4, p. 563-581
|
Subject: | CEO personality | corporate governance | executive compensation | incentive pay | risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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