Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Darmann, Andreas |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 52.2019, 3, p. 527-557
|
Subject: | strategyproofness | group activity | social choice | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Kollektives Handeln | Collective action | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying |
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