Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficinecy defense?

We study horizontal mergers on two-sided markets between horizontally differentiated platforms. We provide a theoretical analysis of the merger's price effect based on the amount of cost savings it generates, the behavior of outsider platforms, and the size of cross-group network effects. We point out differences as compared with the standard, one-sided merger analysis, and also discuss the merger control policy implications.

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Year of publication:	2014-09
Authors:	Baranes, Edmond ; Cortade, Thomas ; Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea
Institutions:	NET Institute
Subject:	horizontal merger \| two-sided markets \| cost savings \| merger control

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 14-12 27 pages
Classification:	L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933641