Minimum wages and excessive effort supply

Matthias Kräkel; Anja Schöttner

It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers' future rents to induce excessively high effort.

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias ; Schöttner, Anja
Publisher:	Mannheim [u. a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	bonuses \| limited liability \| minimum wages \| Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Theorie \| Theory

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