Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.

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Year of publication:	2012-04
Authors:	Segev, Ella ; Sela, Aner
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	All-pay auctions \| Sequential contests

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 8949
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083820