Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Hillas, John ; Samet, Dov |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 135.2022, p. 1-15
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Subject: | Common knowledge of rationality | Correlated equilibrium | Dominance rationality | Strict dominance | Weak dominance | Rationalität | Rationality | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Korrelation | Correlation | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations |
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