Non-optimal mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hartline, Jason D. ; Lucier, Brendan |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 105.2015, 10, p. 3102-3124
|
Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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