Norm elicitation in within-subject designs : testing for order effects

Giovanna D'Adda, Michalis Drouvelis, Daniele Nosenzo

We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	D'Adda, Giovanna ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Nosenzo, Daniele
Publisher:	Nottingham : CEDEX
Subject:	social norms \| norm elicitation \| order effects \| within-subject design \| corruption \| bribe game \| Korruption \| Corruption \| Soziale Norm \| Social norm \| Experiment \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory