North-South Climate Change Negotiations : A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Caparrós Gass, Alejandro ; Pereau, Jean-Christophe ; Tazdaït, Tarik
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Klimaschutz \| Climate protection \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Umweltabkommen \| International environmental agreement \| Nord-Süd-Beziehungen \| North-South relations \| Welt \| World \| Klimawandel \| Climate change

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