Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics

Lars Ehlers; Bettina Klaus

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ehlers, Lars H. ; Klaus, Bettina
Publisher:	Lausanne : Univ. de Lausanne, DEEP
Subject:	indivisible objects allocation \| deferred-acceptance-algorithm \| strategy-proofness \| resource-monotonicity \| population-monotonicity \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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