On delegation under relational contracts

Oliver Gürtler

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task herself enables a much wider use of relational contracts.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Gürtler, Oliver
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Job design \| relational contracts \| formal contracts \| delegation \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Lieferantenmanagement \| Supplier relationship management