On mixed and behavioural strategies

In the context of extensive form games, we are considering the relation between mixed and behavioural strategies. We look again at the famous Kuhn theorem and also discuss a result for games in which no path intersects any information set in more than one node. We apply the principle mathematical of induction on the number of information sets treated behaviourally.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Aliprantis, Charalambos D. ; Glycopantis, Dionysius ; Muir, Allan
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 29.2009, 3, p. 1783-1795
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Extensive form games \| Pure strategies \| Information sets \| Mixed strategies \| Behavioural strategies \| A path \| G-type games \| (No)-Absentmindedness \| Perfect recall \| Equivalence \| Probability distributions \| Marginal probabilities \| Induction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562801