On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions

Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

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Year of publication:	2009-01
Authors:	Tauman, Yair ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Institutions:	Kyiv School of Economics
Subject:	Cooperative games \| aggregate monotonicity \| axiomatic solution \| core \| Shapley value \| nucleolus

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Game Theory 39, 171-175 (2010) Number 13
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976645