On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation : the case of non-linear utilities

Alexey Kushnir; Shuo Liu

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Kushnir, Alexey ; Liu, Shuo
Publisher:	Zurich : Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Bayesian implementation \| dominant strategy implementation \| mechanism design \| non-linear utilities \| single-crossing \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389528