On the existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau; Richard P. McLean

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; MacLean, Richard P.
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey
Subject:	Bayesian game \| discontinuous game \| infinite game of incomplete information \| behavioral strategy \| distributional strategy \| payoff security \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game