On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
Patrick W. Schmitz
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 202.2021, p. 1-5
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| Subject: | Incomplete contracts | Make-or-buy decision | Outsourcing | Private information | Property rights approach | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Make-or- Buy-Entscheidung | Transaktionskosten | Transaction costs | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607205