On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; van Winden, Frans
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Interessenvertretung \| Wahlkampf \| Räumliche Interaktion \| Public Choice \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| spatial voting models \| electoral competition \| winning set \| interest groups

More details

Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 1698
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	510039421 [GVK] hdl:10419/19162 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261435