Optimal CEO incentive contracts : a prospect theory explanation
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aaron, Joshua R. ; Harris, Michael L. ; McDowell, William C. ; Cline, Brandon N. |
Published in: |
Journal of business strategies. - Huntsville, Tex. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0887-2058, ZDB-ID 2055029-7. - Vol. 31.2014, 2, p. 336-356
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
-
Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
Hori, Keiichi, (2020)
-
Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts : experimental evidence
Lefebvre, Mathieu, (2014)
-
CEO compensation : evidence from the field
Edmans, Alex, (2021)
- More ...
-
Aaron, Joshua, (2013)
-
The effects of a team charter on student team behaviors
Aaron, Joshua R., (2014)
-
Irwin, Kristin C., (2018)
- More ...