Optimal contracts for central bankers : inflation versus money supply and exchange rate targets
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Panizza, Ugo |
Published in: |
Open economies review. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, ISSN 0923-7992, ZDB-ID 1073291-3. - Vol. 8.1997, 1, p. 5-29
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Subject: | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Geldpolitisches Ziel | Monetary target | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Theorie | Theory |
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