Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy : effectiveness of in-kind insurance
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Alasseur, Clémence ; Chaton, Corinne ; Hubert, Emma |
Published in: |
Energy economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0140-9883, ZDB-ID 795279-X. - Vol. 106.2022, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Adverse selection | Fuel poverty | Calculus of variations | Contract theory | In-kind insurance | Adverse Selektion | Vertragstheorie | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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