Optimal contracts with random monitoring
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Barbos, Andrei |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 51.2022, 1, p. 119-154
|
Subject: | Optimal contracts | Random monitoring | Moral hazard | Optimal control | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract |
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