Optimal incentive schemes when only the agents "best" output matters to the principal
Steven D. Levitt
| Year of publication: |
1995
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Levitt, Steven D. |
| Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 26.1995, 4, p. 744-760
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| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
| Series: | |
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| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001333864