Optimal incentives for participation with type-dependent externalities
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Feldman, Michal ; Tessler, Ran ; Wilf, Yoav |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : 5th international workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-642-10840-7. - 2009, p. 351-361
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Theorie | Theory |
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