Optimal pollution standards and non-compliance in a dynamic framework

Carmen Arguedas, Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán

Year of publication:	November 2017
Authors:	Arguedas, Carmen ; Cabo García, Francisco José ; Martín Herrán, Guiomar
Published in:	Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 68.2017, 3, p. 537-567
Subject:	Dynamic regulation \| Stackelberg differential games \| Non-compliance \| Fines \| Pollution standards \| Umweltstandard \| Environmental standard \| Normbefolgung \| Legal compliance \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Umweltbelastung \| Pollution \| Umweltökonomik \| Environmental economics \| Standardisierung \| Standardization

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011803764

A service of the