Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

Luke Hu

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hu, Luke
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Procurement \| auctions \| industrial organization \| mechanism design \| Beschaffung \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Industrieökonomik \| Industrial organization