Optimales Franchising : eine ökonomische Analyse von Vertragsgestaltung in Franchise-Beziehungen ; mit 10 Tabellen

Bernd Hempelmann

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Hempelmann, Bernd
Publisher:	Heidelberg : Physica-Verl.
Subject:	Franchising \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Opportunismus \| Opportunism \| Theorie \| Theory \| Franchisevertrag \| Optimierung \| Agency-Theorie
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [external.dandelon.com]

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