Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; He, Kevin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 194.2021, p. 1-39
|
Subject: | Equilibrium refinements | Non-equilibrium learning | Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium | Weighted fictitious play | Lernprozess | Learning process | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
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