Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
David Cantala, Juan Sebastián Pereyra
| Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Cantala, David ; Pereyra, Juan |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 21.2017, 1, p. 49-63
|
| Subject: | Two-sided many-to-one matching | School choice | Boston algorithm | Manipulation strategies | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Matching | Schulauswahl | Theorie | Theory | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Manipulation | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900103